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SUMMARY
This paper proposes a chaotic map-based multicast scheme for multiuser speech wireless communica-
tion and implements it in an ARM platform. The scheme compresses the digital audio signal decoded by
a sound card and then encrypts it with a three-level chaotic encryption scheme. First, the position of every
bit of the compressed data is permuted randomly with a pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS) gener-
ated by a 6-D chaotic map. Then, the obtained data are further permuted in the level of byte with a PRNS
generated by a 7-D chaotic map. Finally, it is operated with a multiround chaotic stream cipher. The
whole system owns the following merits: the redundancy in the original audio file is reduced effectively
and the corresponding unicity distance is increased; the balancing point between a high security level of
the system and real-time conduction speed is achieved well. In the ARM implementation, the framework
of communication of multicastCmultiuser in a subnet and the Internet Group Manage Protocol is adopted
to obtain the function of communication between one client and other ones. Comprehensive test results
were provided to show the feasibility and security performance of the whole system.
keywords and phrases: ARM-embedded implementation, multicast-multiuser, chaotic map, secure
communication, speech, WIFI.
1 Introduction
With popularization of speech (voice and audio) record devices and development of network transmission
techniques, the security of speech transmission is becoming more and more important. To cope with the
challenge, a great number of encryption schemes based on chaos were proposed to protect speech data.
It is well known that some significant properties of chaos, such as positive Lyapunov exponents, ergodic-
ity, quasi-randomness, sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and system parameters, have suggested
chaotic dynamics being a promising alternative for conventional cryptographic algorithm [1–3]. The func-
tion of chaos used in encryption can be categorized as the following classes: 1) generation of scrambling
(permutation) relation [4,5]; 2) producing pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS) [6,7]; 3) realization of
secure communication via chaos synchronization [8–10]; 4) construction of public encryption scheme [11].
Meanwhile, some cryptanalytic works pointed out that some speech encryption schemes are insecure against
the corresponding specific attack methods [12, 13]. To counteract dynamical degradation of digital chaotic
systems, various methods were proposed to weaken or even eliminate the negative influence caused by
the digitization [14–16]. Some methods based on complex networks were proposed to measure the real
degradation degree of the counteract measures [16, 17].
Scrambling is one of most efficient and simple encryption methods [18, 19]. Although reference [20]
presents optimal quantitative cryptanalysis of any position permutation-only encryption scheme against
known/chosen-plaintext attack, they are still widely used in the design of multimedia encryption schemes.
As size of speech and video data is much larger than that of image data, only some important parameters
are selected to be encrypted [21, 22]. To evaluate their importance degree, various criterions were pro-
posed, such as sensible influence [23, 24], and decoding importance [25]. In the field of multimedia secure
communication, most efforts were spent on software implementation, only few works touched hardware
implementation of multimedia encryption scheme [26].
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In this paper, we propose a novel TCP-based multicast scheme for multiuser speech wireless commu-
nication, and implement it in ARM hardware platform. The scheme is designed for scenario of wireless
communication where the balancing point between sufficient security level and low computation load is
expected. The kernel of the scheme is to compress original speech data input from Audio Codec based on
the adaptive differential pulse code modulation (ADPCM) algorithm designed by Interactive Multimedia
Association (IMA) [27]. Then, it encrypts the compressed data with the following three levels of chaotic
encryption: scrambling 1-bit element in each 1-byte data with a 6-D chaotic map; scrambling position of
every 1-byte data with a 7-D chaotic map; encrypting compressed speech data with a chaotic stream cipher
multiple times. The encryption kernel is cascaded with a multicast method connecting sender point to re-
ceiver point with a way of point-to-multiple. Security performance of the proposed system is verified from
various aspects: NIST test, statistical analysis, sensitivity with respect to change of secrete key and size
estimation of secret key space. Compared with video encryption scheme proposed in [26], this scheme still
run sufficient fast as size of speech data is much smaller than that of video data of the same playing time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, a brief introduction is given to multicast-
multiuser wireless communication system. Section 3 presents basic principle of speech compression. Sec-
tion 4 proposes a discrete-time chaotic system without any degeneration and uses it to implement secure and
efficient speech communication scheme. Section 5 designs a multi-round chaotic stream cipher for speech
communication. Section 6 further discusses cascading the proposed speech communication in the multicast
environment for multi-user wireless communication. Section 7 analyzes security performance of the whole
secure communication system. Finally, the last section concludes the paper.
2 Multicast-multiuser wireless communication system
The function diagram of the ARM-based multicast-multiuser communication system is shown in Fig. 1,
where both the sender and the receiver use the same development board ARM9Tiny4412. Its hardware
part includes the following key components: four-core Cortex-A9 processing unit of dominant frequency
1.5GHz, sound card, wireless network card, 1GB DDR3 SDRAM (32-bit data bus), 4GB Flash, and USB
port. The software system can be partitioned into the driver layer and application layer. The former mainly
includes sound card driver, network card driver, the Linux kernel and so on. The latter includes adaptive
speech acquisition, speech compression, three-level chaotic encryption, the sender of encrypted speech sig-
nal, the receiver for encrypted speech signal, three-level chaotic decryption, speech adaptive decompression,
and speech broadcaster.
As shown in Fig. 2, the ARM-based multicast-multiuser communication system owns the following fea-
tures. In the multicast architecture based on ARM+linux embedded devices, a multicast-multiuser chaotic
map-based speech communication is implemented. In the uplink communication of both the sending end
and receiving end, the received data is sent to the application layer through the sound card, network card
and Linux kernel. In the downlink communication, the data is sent to the sound card and network card
by them also. All the receivers can receive multicast data via WIFI signal if they registered the multicast
membership. When the electricity of ARM is turned on, its own WIFI connection program is run first [28].
Once any WIFI signal is detected, WIFI is connected successfully by entering the right account number and
password.
3 Design of data acquisition and compression scheme
Redundancy existing in raw message is very useful for error detection and correction in communication.
However, it is very harmful in cryptology. As pointed out by Shannon, redundancy provides basis for crypt-
analysis, which can be represented as a formula U = H/D, where U , H and D denote unicity distance,
entropy of secret key, and redundancy degree, respectively. It means that there is sole solution for deci-
phering an encryption scheme when the number of ciphertext characters intercepted by the cryptanalysts
is greater than the unicity distance. Otherwise, there is multiple solutions and the complexity of the deci-
phering is very large. From such viewpoint, one can see that compressing speech data before encryption is
helpful for improving security performance of the whole secure communication system.
Every 16-bit digital speech data input from the sound card is compressed into 4-bit data through IMA-
ADPCM, whose most significant bit is the sign bit. Since the C language does not support the data types of
4 bits, two variables of char type are used to represent one compressed variable. Concretely, the PCM data
is compressed and stored into buffer in chronological order, and each BYTE space store two compressed
data, where the four least significant bits store the first one and the four most significant bits store the second
one.
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Figure 1: The function diagram of the ARM-based multicast-multiuser communication system.
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The schematic of speech compression algorithm based on IMA-ADPCM is shown in Fig. 3. First, the
32768 16-bit data collected by sound card are stored into inbuf, and then compressed into 32768 4-bit data
by IMA-ADPCM algorithm. Every two adjacent 4-bit data are combined into one 8-bit data. Finally, 16384
8-bit compressed data are stored into outbuf as one frame.
outbuf outbuf [0]
8 bits
outbuf [1]
8 bits
outbuf [16383]
8 bits
one frame with16384 data after IMA-ADPCM compression
sample 1
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sample 2
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Figure 3: Schematic diagram of the speech compression based on IMA-ADPCM.
4 Design of scrambling scheme for compressed speech data
This section discusses the design of scrambling scheme for compressed speech data. First, position of every
bit of the compressed speech data is permuted randomly with a pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS)
generated by a 6-D chaotic map. Then, the scrambled data is further permuted with a PRNS generated by a
7-D chaotic map in the level of byte.
4.1 Construction of an n-dimensional discrete-time chaotic system
Like [26], we adopt the idea of Chen-Lai chaotification scheme in [2] to construct an n-dimensional discrete-
time chaotic system, which can be generally presented as
x1,k+1= mod (A11x1,k+A12x2,k+· · ·+A1nxn,k,2N1),
x2,k+1= mod (A21x1,k+A22x2,k+· · ·+A2nxn,k,2N2),
· · ·
xn,k+1= mod (An1x1,k+An2x2,k+· · ·+Annxn,k,2Nn),
(1)
where mod (m,n) = m− n · bmn c, and bxc gives the largest integer less than or equal to x. In the proposed
secure communication system, we set N1 = N2 = · · ·= Nn = N0, and N = 2N1 ·2N2 · · · ·2Nn = 2nN0 .
The coefficients Ai j in system (1) are derived from matrix
A=

A11 A12 . . . A1n
A21 A22 . . . A2n
...
...
. . .
...
An1 An2 . . . Ann
= n−1∏
i=1
(
n
∏
j=i+1
Ti j
)
, (2)
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where Ti j is given by
Ti j =

1 0 · · ·
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
0
A(11)i, i 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 A
(12)
i, j
0 1 ··· 0 ··· 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 ··· 1 ··· 0 0
...
... ···
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 ··· 0 ··· 1 0
A(21)j, i 0 ··· 0 ··· 0 A
(22)
j, j
0
. . . · · · · · ·
0 0
... 1 0
... 0 1

. (3)
Algorithm 1 The Transform function
1: function Transform(A)
2: S = 0
3: for x1,k← 0,2N0 −1 do
4: for x2,k← 0,2N0 −1 do · · ·
5: for xn,k← 0,2N0 −1 do
6: E(S,1) = mod (A11x1,k +A12x2,k + · · ·+A1nxn,k,2N0)
7: E(S,2) = mod (A21x1,k +A22x2,k + · · ·+A2nxn,k,2N0)
8: · · ·
9: E(S,n) = mod (An1x1,k +An2x2,k + · · ·+Annxn,k,2N0)
10: S = S+1
11: end for· · ·
12: end for
13: end for
14: return E
15: end function
The mathematical expression of the serial number is
S =
nN0/2
∑
i=1
xi,k ·2n·N0−2·i. (4)
Utilizing Algorithm 1, the corresponding scrambling index can be obtained via
E(S) =
nN0/2
∑
i=1
E(S,αi) ·2n·N0−2·i, (5)
where αi ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, and α1 6= α2 6= · · · 6= αn.
4.2 Scrambling the compressed speech data in the level of bit
Set the variables in system (1) as n = 6, N0 = 2, the number of possible scrambling is N = 2n·N0 = 26·2 =
4096. Then, position of every bit of the compressed data is permuted randomly with a PRNS generated by
the 6-D chaotic map constructed in the above sub-section. As illustrated in Fig. 3, each frame of compressed
speech data has 16384 bits. So, it needs to be divided into 32 groups, and each group has 512 bytes. There
are 512 · 8 = 4096 bits of data, so the positions of the 4096 bits of data are scrambled to complete the
encryption. After repeating the method 32 times to complete encryption of one frame of compressed speech
data, the diagram of scrambling 1-bit data position is shown in Fig. 4. Similarly, the 8-bit data in inbuf[k4]
becomes outbuf[k4] by scrambling 1-bit data position 8 times, which is shown in Fig. 5. The original speech
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Figure 4: Schematic diagram of bit permutation.
compressed data is temporarily stored in the inbuf, the encrypted data is stored in the outbuf, and all bits of
data in the outbuf are set as zero initially.
According to Fig. 4, the corresponding chaotic encryption algorithm is described as follows:
• Step 1: According to Eq. (4), Eq. (5) and Fig. 4, the value of S is mapped to E(S), and the corre-
sponding coordinate is (i, j);
• Step 2: Extract 1-bit data unit corresponding to the i-th row and the j-th column in inbuf as
(inbuf[i]>> j)&1 ∈ {0,1}.
• Step 3: The positions of data are then scrambled by 6-D chaotic mapping table, and the coordinates
are mapped to {
x = b6-D-map-table[i ·8+ j]/8c,
y = mod (6-D-map-table[i ·8+ j],8), (6)
• Step 4: Replace 1-bit data in the corresponding unit from (i, j) to (x,y) via
Outbuf[x] = (((Inbuf[i] j)&1) y)∨Outbuf[x],
where the symbol “ j” denotes right shift of j bits, “ y” denotes left shift of y bits, “&” denotes
the bitand operation, “∨” denotes the bitwise OR operation, and “ mod ” represents modulo operation.
Set the parameters in Eq. (3), A(11)i,i = A
(11) = 1, A(12)i, j = A
(12) = 1, A(21)j,i = A
(21) = 1, A(22)j, j = A
(22) = 2,
n = 6, then one has
A6 =
5
∏
i=1
(
6
∏
j=i+1
Ti j
)
=

1 5 18 52 121 197
1 6 22 64 149 242
1 5 19 55 128 208
1 4 13 38 88 144
1 3 8 20 48 80
1 2 4 8 16 32
 . (7)
A concrete example is provided to illustrate the algorithm for scrambling of 1-bit data position:
• According to Eq. (4), Eq. (5) and Fig. 4, when S = 14, E(S) = 1792, then the corresponding coordi-
nate (i, j) = (1,6).
• Extract 1-bit data unit corresponding to the i = 1-th row and the j = 6-th column in inbuf as
(inbuf[1]>> 6)&1 = 0.
• The positions of data are then scrambled by 6-D chaotic mapping table, and the coordinates are
mapped to 
x = b6-D-map-table[1 ·8+6]/8c= b1792/8c= 224,
y = mod (6-D-map-table[1 ·8+6],8)
= mod (1792,8) = 0.
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Figure 5: Schematic diagram of eight rounds of bit permutation.
• The 1-bit data in the corresponding unit is moved from (i, j) = (1,6) to (x,y) = (224,0) via
Outbuf[224] = (((Inbuf[1] 6)&1) 0)∨Outbuf[224].
Finally, all the 0’s in (i, j) = (1,6) are replaced by the corresponding unit in (x,y) = (224,0). The rest
cases follow the rule shown in Fig. 6 similarly.
X X X X X X X Xinbuf[0]
X 0 X X X X X Xinbuf[1]
X X X X X X X Xinbuf[224]
X X X X X X X Xinbuf[511]
inbuf j
i X X X X X X X 0
X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X
y
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01234567 01234567
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outbuf
① extract bit value of line 1 and column 6
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Figure 6: The schematic diagram of scrambling one typical element.
To decrypt the received messages, two cases must be distinguished: communication with matched pa-
rameters and that with mismatched parameters. Taking the order of 15 matrices in Eq. (7) as the key, the
analysis results with matched parameters and that with mismatched parameters are shown as follows:
1) With matched parameters, the permutation matrix at the receiving end is still the same as that shown
in Eq. (7). When (x,y) = (224,0), one has (8x+ y) = (8 · 224+ 0) = 1792. After the decryption, 0’s can
be replaced back to the correct position (i, j) = (1,6). Similarly, the other encrypted information can be
correctly decrypted at the receiving end.
2) Assume that the original arrangement is
T12T13T14T15T16T23T24T25T26T34T35T36T45T46T56,
7
T12 and T34 are swapped by the mismatched parameters, the transformation matrix become
A6 =

5 9 11 29 68 113
1 2 3 8 19 31
11 20 24 65 152 252
16 29 33 91 212 352
4 7 8 20 48 80
3 5 4 8 16 32
 .
As 8x+ y = 8 · 224+ 0 = 1792, 0’s is replaced by the decryption process to a wrong position, (i, j) =
(0,1) , instead of right position (i, j) = (1,6). So, the encrypted information cannot be correctly decrypted
at the receiving end.
4.3 Scrambling the compressed speech data in the level of BYTE
In the second-level of encryption, let n = 7, N0 = 2, the number of the position scrambling is N = 2n·N0 =
27·2 = 16384. The data is further permuted in the level of byte with a PRNS generated by a 7-D chaotic
map. Positions of frames of size 1×16384 are then scrambled as shown in Fig. 7, where the original speech
compressed data is temporarily stored in the inbuf, the encrypted data is temporarily stored in the outbuf,
where ki ∈ {0,1,2, · · · ,16383} and k0 6= k1 6= k2 6= · · · 6= k16383.
7D-map
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Figure 7: Schematic diagram of scrambling and anti-scrambling of 8 bits speech compressed data.
When n = 7, the sequence number S of the speech compression data before encryption is
S =
7
∑
i=1
xi,k ·214−2i. (8)
The corresponding sequence number S of the speech compression data after encryption is
E(S) =
7
∑
i=1
E(S,αi) ·214−2i, (9)
where αi ∈ {1,2, · · · ,7}, α1 6= α2 · · · 6= α7.
Setting coefficients in Eq. (3), A(11)i,i = A
(11) = 1, A(12)i, j = A
(12) = 1, A(21)j,i = A
(21) = 1, A(22)j, j = A
(22) = 2,
n = 7, one has
A7 =
6
∏
i=1
(
7
∏
j=i+1
Ti j
)
(10)
=

1 6 25 84 237 550 903
1 7 30 102 289 671 1100
1 6 26 88 249 578 948
1 5 19 63 176 408 672
1 4 13 38 104 240 400
1 3 8 20 48 112 192
1 2 4 8 16 32 64

.
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A concrete example is illustrated the algorithm for scrambling position of every byte. Let S = i = 100,
E(S) = E(i) = ki = 3296. The position S = 100 for 8-bit data “11100101” is replaced by E(S) = 3296.
Taking the order of 21 matrices in Eq. (10) as the key, the analysis results with matched parameters and
that with mismatched parameters are shown as follows.
1) With matched parameters, the permutation matrix at the receiving end is still that shown in Eq. (10).
Given E(S) = 3296, one can get S = 100. After the decryption process, the 8-bit data is replaced back to
the right position. The other cases run in the similar way. So, the encrypted speech data can be decrypted
successfully.
2) Assume the original arrangement is
T12T13T14T15T16T17T23T24T25T26T27T34T35T36T37T45T46T47T56T57T67,
T12 and T45 are swapped by mismatched parameters, the transformation matrix becomes
A7 =

6 11 20 53 138 322 539
1 2 5 14 37 87 144
7 13 26 70 183 428 714
11 20 32 81 212 492 828
16 29 45 111 292 676 1140
4 7 8 20 48 112 192
3 5 4 8 16 32 64

.
Setting the above matrix and Eq. (8), (9), S = 491, one can get E(S) = 3296. After the decryption,
the byte is replaced to the wrong position of index S = 491 instead of index S = 100. So, the encrypted
information cannot be correctly decrypted at the receiving end.
5 Encrypting compressed speech data by multi-round stream cipher
This section discusses design of the third level of chaotic encryption scheme for the compressed speech
data. First, we propose a general design method for discrete chaotic systems without degeneration of
positive Lyapunov exponent. Then, we use 3-D version of the chaotic systems to encrypt 8-bit compressed
speech data multiple times.
5.1 Design of discrete time chaotic system without degeneration of positive Lya-
punov exponents
The relation between random statistical characteristic of a chaotic system and Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy
can be represented as
hKS =∑
i
LE+i ,
where LE+i is the number of positive Lyapunov exponents [2]. As the larger value of hKS means the better
statistical properties of randomness, a chaotic system owns better random statistical performance if it has
more and larger positive Lyapunov exponents. In our design of discrete time chaotic system, we try to
make the number and the quantity of its positive Lyapunov exponents both reach maximum. The concrete
approaches can be described as follows.
Step 1: The general form of a nominal system with asymptotically stable origin is
x(k+1) = Cx(k), (11)
where C=
 c11 · · · c1n... . . . ...
cn1 · · · cnn
 is a constant matrix, and all characteristic roots of the nominal system are
located inside an unit circle.
Step 2: To control the nominal system (11) effectively, transform it as
x(k+1) = Ax(k), (12)
where
A= PCP−1,
9
and P is a nonsingular matrix. Due to the properties of similarity transformation, the two systems, (11) and
(12), have the same characteristic roots and stability performance.
Step 3: Control the system (12) with the strategy of anticontrol proposed in [2] and get a uniformly
bounded system
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bg(σx(k),ε), (13)
where g(σx(k),ε) is a uniformly bounded controller and B is a control matrix.
Step 4: Exert pole assignment on the system (13) by adjusting B, σ and ε and make the number of its
positive Lyapunov exponents L reach maximum and the quantities can be sufficiently large, i.e. the system
(13) reach the state without degeneration.
To illustrate performance of the above method, we present a concrete example of 3-D system,
x1(k+1) = a11x1(k)+a12x2(k)+a13x3(k), f1(·),
x2(k+1) = a21x1(k)+a22x2(k)+a23x3(k), f2(·),
x3(k+1) = a31x1(k)+a32x2(k)+a33x3(k)
+ ε sin(σx1(k)), f3(·),
(14)
where
A=
a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
=
 0.205 −0.595 0.265−0.265 −0.125 0.595
0.33 −0.33 0.47
 ,
and σ = 6.6667ε/10−4.
Figure 8 depicts Lyapunov spectrum of the system (14) for ε ∈ [0,300], where LE1, LE2 and LE3 denote
Lyapunov exponents in three dimensions, respectively. From Fig. 8, we can see that the Lyapunov exponent
becomes more and more large and be positive in most cases when ε > 100. When ε = 3 ·108, σ = 2 ·105,
one can calculate LE1 = 14.9, LE2 = 14.8, LE2 = 0.19, the corresponding phase diagram is shown in Fig. 9.
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Figure 8: Lyapunov spectrum with parameter ε and σ .
5.2 The design principle of multi-round stream cipher
The design principle of multi-round stream cipher is shown in Fig. 10. The iterative equations x(d)i (k+1) =
f (d)i (·) and x(r)i (k+1) = f (r)i (·) (i = 1,2,3) defined in system (14), are implemented with double-precision
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Figure 9: Phase diagram of a 3-D chaotic attractor: a) x1− x2 plane; b) x2− x3 plane.
arithmetic. Functions int[x(d)1 (k)] and int[x
(r)
1 (k)] transform the variables from double type to 64-bit integer.
The modulo function mod (28) get the eight least significant bits of the 64-bit integer, which will be used
for encryption of 8-bit speech signal. To further enhance the ability to resist differential attack, we propose
an encryption scheme by M-rounds chaotic stream cipher for each frame of the speech data. Security
analysis shows that this scheme can greatly enhance the ability to resist differential attack. The whole
framework shown in Fig. 10 consists of four parts: encryption scheme based on multi-round of chaotic
stream cipher at the sending end, decryption scheme based on multi-round of chaotic stream cipher at
the receiving end, channel and the switch function of K1, K2, K3, and K4. The four switch functions
can be programmed through C language. The main feature of this scheme is that the x(d)1 (k) at second
and third equations of chaotic system in Fig. 10 are replaced by the output feedback through closed-loop
feedback (including the speech signal) at the sending end. Then, the final encrypted speech signal after
M-round encryption is transmitted via WIFI. At the receiving end, x(r)1 (k) at second and third equations
of chaotic system are replaced by the received encrypted speech signal after M-round encryption. Then,
the corresponding M-rounds of speech signal decryption makes chaotic systems at the sending end and the
receiving end synchronize, i.e., the decryption can be achieved successfully.
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Figure 10: Design principle of multi-round stream cipher.
The basic operation principle of encryption scheme based on multi-round of chaotic stream cipher
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shown in Fig. 10 is summarized as follows:
(1) At the sending end, the operation principle of the M-round encryption for each frame of the speech
data is as follows: First, place K1 at position 1 in Fig. 10 and encrypt a frame of signal. Then, place K1 at
position 2 in Fig. 10, the encrypted frame is encrypted again via feedback K1. The process is repeated M
times. After M-rounds of encryption, K2 is turned on and this frame of the speech signal at the final round
encryption is outputted by the channel. Then, K1 is located at position 1 again, the next frame of the speech
signal is encrypted similarly. By this way, the M-rounds of encryption is done frame by frame.
(2) At the receiving end, the operating principle of the M rounds of decryption for each frame of the
speech data is illustrated as follows: First, K3 is located at position 1, a frame of signal is decrypted. Then
K3 is located at position 2, this frame of signal is decrypted again by feedback K3. The process is repeated
M times. After M rounds of encryption, K4 is turned on and this frame of the speech signal at the final
round decryption is outputted. Then, K3 is located at position 1 again, the next frame of the speech signal
is decrypted similarly.
According to Fig. 10, a chaotic system (14) is used for the encryption, the basic iterative equation of
chaotic map-based encryption system at the sending end is
x(d)1 (k+1) = a
(d)
11 x
d
1(k)+a
(d)
12 x
r
2(k)+a
(d)
13 x
d
3(k),
x(d)2 (k+1) = a
(d)
21 p(k)+a
(d)
22 x
d
2(k)+a
(d)
23 x
d
3(k),
x(d)3 (k+1) = a
(d)
31 p(k)+a
(d)
32 x
d
2(k)+a
(d)
33 x
d
3(k)
+ ε(d) sin(σ (d)p(k)).
(15)
At the receiver, one gets the decryption system, given by
x(r)1 (k+1) = a
(r)
11 x
r
1(k)+a
(r)
12 x
r
2(k)+a
(r)
13 x
r
3(k),
x(r)2 (k+1) = a
(r)
21 p(k)+a
(r)
22 x
r
2(k)+a
(r)
23 x
r
3(k),
x(r)3 (k+1) = a
(r)
31 p(k)+a
(r)
32 x
r
2(k)+a
(r)
33 x
r
3(k)
+ ε(r) sin(σ (r)p(k)),
(16)
where p(k) = mod (
⌊
x(d)1 (k)
⌋
,28)⊕ s(k), s(k) is the k-th element of the input speech signal, and ⊕ denotes
exclusive OR operation.
When parameters of the both sides match, one has a(d)i, j = a
(r)
i, j = ai, j, (1≤ i, j ≤ 3), ε(d) = ε(r) = ε , and
σ (d) = σ (r) = σ . First, according to the second and third equations of system (15) and (16), the iterative
equation corresponding to the error signal is(
∆x2(k+1)
∆x3(k+1)
)
=
(
a22 a22
a32 a33
)
·
(
∆x2(k)
∆x3(k)
)
.
Then, one can further get (
∆x2(k)
∆x3(k)
)
=
(
a22 a22
a32 a33
)k
·
(
∆x2(0)
∆x3(0)
)
, (17)
where ∆x2(0) and ∆x3(0) are initial values, ∆x2 = x
(r)
2 (k)− x(d)2 (k), and ∆x3 = x(r)3 (k)− x(d)3 (k). Taking
norm on both sides of Eq. (17), one can get∥∥∥∥(∆x2(k)∆x3(k)
)∥∥∥∥≤ ∥∥∥∥(a22 a22a32 a33
)∥∥∥∥k ·∥∥∥∥(∆x2(0)∆x3(0)
)∥∥∥∥ . (18)
As the characteristic roots corresponding to
(
a22 a22
a32 a33
)
located in the unit circle, one can assure that its
norm is less than one from the Gershgorin circle theorem. So, one has
lim
k→∞
‖∆xi(k)‖= lim
k→∞
‖x(r)i (k)− x(d)i (k)‖= 0, (19)
where i = 2,3.
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Now, we further consider the convergence of the error variable ∆x1(k). According to the first equation
of system (15) and (16), one can get error iterative equation as
∆x1(k+1) = a11∆x1(k)+a12∆x2(k)+a13∆x3(k), (20)
where ∆x1(k) = x
(r)
1 (k)− x(d)1 (k).
When k→ ∞, one can get ∆x2(k)→ 0 and ∆x3(k)→ 0 from Eq. (19). So, one has
lim
k→∞
∆x1(k+1) = lim
k→∞
a11∆x1(k). (21)
As |a11|< 1, one has
lim
k→∞
‖∆x1‖= lim
k→∞
‖x(r)1 (k)− x(d)1 (k)‖= 0. (22)
Now, one can see that Eq. (15) and (16) can be synchronized when the parameters are matched. In the
receiving end, the original speech signal can be correctly decrypted as sˆ(k) = s(k)⊕ mod (
⌊
x(d)1 (k)
⌋
,28)⊕
mod (
⌊
x(r)1 (k)
⌋
,28) = s(k). In addition, with the matched parameters, the case for multiple rounds of en-
cryption has the similar results. Note that Eq. (19) and (22) can assure exponential asymptotic convergence,
synchronization errors can be ignored just after a few iterations, and the synchronization of the chaotic
system at the sending end and the receiving end can be achieved quickly, i.e., the speech signal can be
decrypted exactly.
6 Design of a multicast scheme for multiuser wireless communica-
tion and its Hardware implementation
The diagram of the multicast-multiuser chaotic map-based speech communication system is shown in
Fig. 11, and the corresponding hardware platform is shown in Fig. 12. At the sending end, after IMA-
ADPCM compression of the input speech signal, three-level chaotic encryption scheme on speech commu-
nication is exerted. The specific encryption and its corresponding encryption keys are described as follows:
The first stage is that the position of every bit of the speech data is permuted randomly, the encryption
key is the arrangement of the matrices given in Eq. (7), i.e.,
T12T13T14T15T16T23T24T25T26T34T35T36T45T46T56.
The second stage is scrambling of 8-bit data position, the encryption key is the arrangement of the matrix
(10), i.e.,
T12T13T14T15T16T17T23T24T25T26T27T34T35T36T37T45T46T47T56T57T67.
The third stage is encrypting speech data values by multi-round stream cipher, the encryption key of param-
eter matrix is
A=
 0.205 −0.595 0.265−0.265 −0.125 0.595
0.33 −0.33 0.47
 .
At the receiving end, the original speech signal can be recovered by the corresponding inverse process
only when all the decryption key at the receiving end matches the encryption key at the sending end.
In this experiment, we select number of rounds for encryption M = 5. The construction of multicast-
multiuser includes one server at sending end and two clients at the receiving end (note that this construction
of multicast-multiuser is also applicable for multiple clients at receiving end), the hardware experimental
results are obtained as follows:
(1) The ARM implementation of the original speech signal input and the speech signal with three-level
chaotic encryption after IMA-ADPCM compression are shown in the top and the bottom of Fig. 13a),
respectively.
(2) When all the keys for the server at sending end and two clients at receiving end are matched, the
ARM implementation results for the original speech signal, the decrypted speech signal at the first receiving
end and the decrypted speech signal at the second receiving, are shown in the three rows of Fig. 13b),
respectively.
(3) All the keys for the server at sending end and the second client at receiving end are matched, but one
decryption key for one round of decryption for the first client at the receiving end mismatches the encryption
key at the receiving end. These lead to the following three conditions:
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Figure 11: The framework of the multicast-multiuser chaotic map-based speech communication system.
1. The first level encryption key for the server at sending end is
T12T13T14T15T16T23T24T25T26T34T35T36T45T46T56.
Then, the mismatched key of the first level decryption for the first client at receiving end is
T34T13T14T15T16T23T24T25T26T12T35T36T45T46T56.
2. The second level encryption key for the server at sending end is
T12T13T14T15T16T17T23T24T25T26T27T34T35T36T37T45T46T47T56T57T67.
Then, the mismatched key for the second level decryption for the first client at receiving end is
T45T13T14T15T16T17T23T24T25T26T27T34T35T36T37T12T46T47T56T57T67.
3. The key for the third level encryption for the server at sending end is
A=
 0.205 −0.595 0.265−0.265 −0.125 0.595
0.33 −0.33 0.47
 .
Then, the mismatched key for the third level decryption for the first client at receiving end is ∆a11 = 10−9
instead of a11. When there is any given mismatched key at any level of decryption, the ARM implementation
results for the original speech signal, the decrypted speech signal at the first receiving end and the decrypted
speech signal at the second receiving, are obtained in the three rows of Fig. 13c), respectively.
(4) All the keys for the server at sending end and the first client at receiving end are matched, but
one decryption key for one round of decryption for the second client at the receiving end mismatches the
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encryption key at the receiving end. These cause the similar three conditions as above. Then, the ARM
implementation results for the original speech signal, the decrypted speech signal at the first receiving end
and the decrypted speech signal at the second receiving end, are obtained in the three rows of Fig. 13d),
respectively. The video recordings of the ARM-embedded hardware experimental results can be accessed
in the companion page of [26].
Figure 12: The hardware implementation of the multicast-multiuser chaotic map-based speech communi-
cation system.
7 Analysis of security performance
7.1 Test results with NIST test suite
In the test suite designed by National Institute of Standards and Technology in [29], 100 sequences of length
106 bits, the P-value fall in the interval [0.0001,1], it is considered that the random bit sequence generator
pass the test, and fail otherwise.
In the encryption scheme composed of multi-round stream cipher shown in Fig. 10, after the iterative
sequence is converted into 64-bit integers, its eight least significant bits of the speech signal are encrypted.
Therefore, the 1×108 bits sequence is made up of every eight least significant bits of iterative sequence in
the corresponding NIST test suite, the test results are shown in Table 1, where symbol “-” indicates that the
corresponding test failed. The relationship between the test results and the Lyapunov exponents is explained
as follows:
(1) The results of P-value (1) with the corresponding parameter ε = 100 and σ = 0.0667, the Lya-
punov exponents are obtained as LE1 =−0.0017, LE2 =−0.0993, LE3 =−0.2229, respectively. Since the
Lyapunov exponents are all negative, the generated sequence can not pass any item in the NIST test suite.
(2) The results of P-value (2) with the corresponding parameter ε = 300 and σ = 0.2, the Lyapunov
exponents are obtained as LE1 = 1.1041, LE2 = 0.9588, LE3 = 0.1828, respectively. Since the Lyapunov
exponents are not big enough, only two items in the NIST test suite can be passed.
(3) The results of P-value (3) with the corresponding parameter ε = 3000 and σ = 2, the Lyapunov
exponents are obtained as LE1 = 3.3825, LE2 = 3.287, LE3 = 0.1893, respectively. Only nine items in the
NIST test suite can be passed.
(4) The results of P-value (4) with the corresponding parameter ε = 30000 and σ = 2, the Lyapunov
exponents are obtained as LE1 = 5.6879, LE2 = 5.65, LE3 = 0.1895, respectively. Only 13 items in the
NIST test suite can be passed.
(5) The results of P-value (5) with the corresponding parameter ε = 3 ·105 and σ = 200, the Lyapunov
exponents are obtained as LE1 = 7.9827, LE2 = 7.9814, LE3 = 0.1895, respectively. In this case, fourteen
items in the NIST test suite can be passed.
(6) The results of P-value (6) with the corresponding parameter ε = 3 ·108 and σ = 2 ·105, the Lyapunov
exponents are obtained as LE1 = 14.8403, LE2 = 14.8107, LE3 = 0.1903, respectively. Since the Lyapunov
exponents are all positive and big enough, all items in the NIST test suite can be passed.
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Figure 13: The original speech signal and the encrypted speech signal.
Table 1: The performed tests and the ratio of sequences passing each test in a sample of 100 sequences.
Statistical Test P-value (1) P-value (2) P-value (3) P-value (4) P-value (5) P-value (6)
Frequency – – 0.946308 0.867692 0.798139 0.759756
Block Frequency – – 0.035174 0.062821 0.574903 0.437274
Cumulative Sums – – 0.7886635 0.448529 0.67685 0.2636575
Runs – – 0.574903 0.12962 0.035174 0.616305
Long Runs of Ones – – 0.455937 0.249284 0.090936 0.534146
Rank – 0.108791 0.289667 0.946308 0.181557 0.946308
FFT – – 0.514124 0.534146 0.699313 0.096578
Non-overlapping Templates – – – – – 0.528973
Overlapping Templates – – 0.249284 0.816537 0.924076 0.191687
Universal – – 0.867692 0.55442 0.181557 0.474986
Approximate Entropy – – – 0.319084 0.595549 0.739918
Random Excursions – – – 0.3943705 0.35054825 0.68632925
Random Excursions Variant – – – – 0.344756 0.6600216
Serial – – – 0.428899 0.0458625 0.7494675
Linear Complexity – 0.366918 – 0.991468 0.935716 0.032923
Success 0/15 2/15 9/15 13/15 14/15 15/15
As shown in Table 1, the value of positive Lyyapunov exponents increases and degeneracy disappears
as increase of ε and σ , so the generated sequence can pass all test items.
7.2 Statistical analysis
Taking one frame of speech data for example, the statistical analysis of this frame of speech data before
and after the encryption by multi-round stream cipher is performed to obtain the corresponding histogram
shown in Fig. 14.
As presented in Fig. 14, the chaotic sequence owns good randomness, so the encrypted audio data
approaches uniform distribution. Thus, the proposed encryption method makes the ciphertext own weak
correlation with the secrete key,
H(K|C1C2 · · · ,Cn)≈ H(K),
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Figure 14: The statistical analysis of one frame of speech data before and after the encryption by multi-
round stream cipher: (a) The original speech signal; (b) The distribution of the original speech signal;
(c) The speech signal encrypted by multi-round stream cipher; (d) The distribution of the speech signal
encrypted by multi-round stream cipher.
where H is the information entropy, K is the secret key, C1C2 · · · ,Cn are cipher elements. Thus, it increases
the capability of withstanding statistical attacks and ciphertext-only attack much.
7.3 Analysis of performance against differential attack
The differential analysis plays an important role in the security analysis of chaotic cryptosystem, it can
demonstrate whether the encryption results are sensitive to change of the plaintext, namely the “avalanche
effect”. If the chaotic cryptosystem can withstand the differential attack, any variation in the plaintext could
cause serious affect in the ciphertext. Such impact is widely measured by tow factors, NPCR (Number of
Pixels Change Rate) and UACI (Unified Average Changing Intensity) [2],
NPCR =
∑
i
D(i)
F
·100%,
UACI =
1
F
·∑
i
|C(i)−C′(i)|
255
·100%,
(23)
where {
C = [C1C2 · · ·CF ]
C′ = [C′1C
′
2 · · ·C′F ],
D(i) =
{
1 if C(i) 6=C′(i),
0 if C(i) =C′(i),
C(i) and C′(i) denote the i-th element of two cipheretext C and C′, respectively.
To study influence of each element of the original speech data for the corresponding ciphertext, a frame
of speech data of 16384 elements is selected to calculate NPCR and UACI corresponding to each element,
then the average value is calculated as
NPCR =
16384
∑
m=1
NPCR(m)/16384,
UACI =
16384
∑
m=1
UACI(m)/16384,
(24)
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where NPCR(m) and UACI(m) denote the NPCR value and UACI value of the m-th element.
According to Eq. (24), it is shown in Fig. 10 that NPCR = 49.8% and UACI = 16.73% after first round
of encryption. When M = 2, it is shown in Fig. 10 that NPCR = 99.61% and UACI = 33.47% after second
round encryption. In addition, NPCR and UACI become more and more larger with increase of round
number.
By comparison of the above results, it is obvious that the ability of one-round encryption to resist
differential attack is weaker than that of two-round encryption. The underlying mechanisms are detailed
below.
In the method shown in Fig. 10, the sequence is encrypted from left to right in the encryption of one
frame of speech data by one-round chaotic stream cipher, encryption for one speech frame is arranged as
s(1)→ s(2)→ s(3), · · · ,s(16383)→ s(16384). Then, after 16384 iterations, the one-round encryption for
one frame of speech data is completed.
Figure 10 shows the encryption and decryption process based on chaotic stream cipher, whose main
feature is the use of a closed loop feedback system. That means the encrypted results should be fed back to
the original one through the feedback system after each encryption, and makes the speech data and chaotic
system “all rolled into one”. Thus, any slight variation in the plaintext data has a significant impact on the
ciphertext.
However, there is a problem with the one-round encryption scheme: there are obvious differences
among the impacts on the ciphertext caused by the variation in the different positions of the plaintext data.
Specifically, the variation in data of the smaller index i has stronger influence on the ciphertext, and the
calculated NPCR and UACI are relatively big. The underlying reason is that the element of smaller index i
is encrypted earlier, the encrypted result can be earlier feedback to the original system through the feedback
loop. More iterations the feedback to the original system are, more easier the data and the chaotic system
combine. Thus the impacts on the ciphertext caused by the variation in the position are greater. The element
of bigger index is encrypted later, and the encrypted results are feedback to the original system later. The
more less the feedback to the original system iterates, the more harder efficient combination of the data and
the chaotic system becomes. Thus, the impacts on the ciphertext caused by the variation in the position are
smaller.
If multi-round encryption scheme is used, the results are different from one-round encryption. For
example, in the case of more than two or two rounds encryption scheme, even for speech data s(16384), the
encrypted results also have the opportunity to mix efficiently with chaotic system in the next round of the
encryption through the feedback loop to the original system. It is a fundamental solution for the problem
that the impacts on the ciphertext caused by the variation in the bigger index are small.
7.4 Sensitivity with respect to change of parameters of the discrete chaotic system
Any secure encryption system is expected to own “avalanche effect” with respect to change of secret key,
i.e. tiny change of one sub-key can cause dramatic change of the corresponding ciphertext. The smaller
magnitude of the mismatch errors, the better security of the system. In this subsection, we analyzed param-
eter sensitivity of the proposed system under different round numbers.
7.4.1 The case under round number of one
Set the absolute value of error caused by the mismatched key parameters between the receiving end and the
sending end as |∆ai, j|= |a(r)i, j −a(d)i, j |, 1≤ i, j≤ 3. Suppose that there are only one mismatched key parameter
in |∆ai, j| and others are matched. As the original speech signal cannot be decrypted, it was tested that the
error matrix caused by one-round encryption scheme shown in Fig. 10 with mismatched key parameter is
|∆a|C1 ,
|∆a|11 |∆a|12 |∆a|13|∆a|21 |∆a|22 |∆a|23
|∆a|31 |∆a|32 |∆a|33
∝
10−5 10−5 10−55 10−5 10−5
5 10−5 10−5
 . (25)
The underlined part of the above formula indicates that the corresponding key parameter is not sen-
sitive to the mismatch errors, which is mainly caused by that each encrypted speech data p(k) = mod
(
⌊
x(d)1 (k)
⌋
,28)⊕ s(k) is fed back to these items by the feedback loop.
According to Eq. (25), one-round encryption scheme shown in Fig. 10 exists two invalid key parameters
and only seven valid key parameters, the absolute value of the error for mismatch valid key parameters is
of magnitude 10−5. The underlying reasons are analyzed as follows:
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According to Eq. (25), the mismatch error of |∆a21| and |∆a31| are of the same magnitude, the other
mismatch errors ∆ai j (i 6= 2,3; j 6= 1) are also in the another same magnitude. Therefore, only need to study
|∆a31| and |∆a32|, the similar results of other mismatched error can be obtained.
(1) Set ε(d)= ε(r)= ε , σ (d)=σ (r)=σ , assume that there is only one mismatch error |∆a31 = a(r)31 −a(d)31 |
in a31, and the other parameters are matched, according to Eq. (15) and (16), the iterative equation of the
error signal is given as 
∆x1(k+1) = a11∆x1(k)+a12∆x2(k)+a13∆x3(k),
∆x2(k+1) = a22∆x2(k)+a23∆x3(k),
∆x3(k+1) = ∆a31 p(k)+a32∆x2(k)+a33∆x3(k).
(26)
When the error signal reaches a steady state, ∆xi(k+ 1) = ∆xi(k) is satisfied for i = 1,2,3. The above
equation becomes 
∆x1(k) = a11∆x1(k)+a12∆x2(k)+a13∆x3(k),
∆x2(k) = a22∆x2(k)+a23∆x3(k),
∆x3(k) = ∆a31 p(k)+a32∆x2(k)+a33∆x3(k).
(27)
Solving the above equation, one can obtain
∆x1(k) =−0.0887 ·∆a31 p(k),
∆x2(k) = 0.7507 ·∆a31 p(k),
∆x3(k) = 1.4194 ·∆a31 p(k).
(28)
(2) Set ε(d)= ε(r)= ε , σ (d)=σ (r)=σ , assume that there is only one mismatch error |∆a32 = a(r)32 −a(d)32 |
in a32, and the other parameters are matched, a
(r)
i j = a
(d)
i j = ai j for i 6= 3, j 6= 2. According to Eq. (15) and
(16), the iterative equation with an error signal is given as
∆x1(k+1) = a11∆x1(k)+a12∆x2(k)+a13∆x3(k),
∆x2(k+1) = a22∆x2(k)+a23∆x3(k),
∆x3(k+1) = a32∆x2(k)+∆a32x2(k)+a33∆x3(k).
(29)
When the error signal reaches a steady state, ∆x1(k+ 1) = ∆x1(k) is satisfied for i = 1,2,3. The above
equation becomes 
∆x1(k) = a11∆x1(k)+a12∆x2(k)+a13∆x3(k),
∆x2(k) = a22∆x2(k)+a23∆x3(k),
∆x3(k) = a32∆x2(k)+∆a32x2(k)+a33∆x3(k).
(30)
Solving the above set of equations, one can obtain
∆x1(k) =−0.0887 ·∆a32x2(k),
∆x2(k) = 0.7507 ·∆a32x2(k),
∆x3(k) = 1.4194 ·∆a32x2(k).
(31)
According to Fig. 9, the maximum magnitude of x2(k) is 108. From Fig. 10, one can see that the
maximum magnitude of p(k) is 28. Dividing the left part and the right part of Eq. (28) with that of Eq. (31),
respectively, one can get
|∆a31|
|∆a32| ∝
|x2(k)|max
|p(k)|max ∝ 10
5.
This explains insensitivity of parameter mismatch and error matrix given in Eq. (25).
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7.4.2 The case under multiple rounds
In multi-round of encryption, for example, set M = 2 in Fig. 10, it was tested that the error matrix caused
by two-round encryption in Fig. 10 with mismatched key parameter is
|∆a|C2 ∝
10−8 10−8 10−810−2 10−8 10−8
10−2 10−8 10−8
 . (32)
According to the above equation, two-round encryption in Fig. 10 exists 9 key parameters, the errors of
mismatched key parameters are of magnitude between 10−8 and 10−2. Similarly, set M = 5 in Fig. 10, it
was tested that the error matrix caused by five-rounds encryption in Fig. 10 with mismatched key parameter
is
|∆a|C5 ∝
10−9 10−9 10−910−3 10−9 10−9
10−3 10−9 10−9
 . (33)
In particular, the absolute value of error caused by the mismatched key parameters in Eq. (25), (32), (33)
does not need to be very accurate, and the coarse scope is enough. In addition, Eq. (25) and (32), (33)
mean that receiving end can’t decrypt the original speech signal if error of any key parameter is greater
than or equal to a given magnitude. In conclusion, by comparing Eq. (25), (32), (33), we can conclude that
the avalanche effect in the mismatch of key parameter is significantly enhanced with increase of the round
number.
When the round number of encryption is increased, the key parameter becomes increasingly sensitive
due to the extreme sensitivity of the chaotic system, and with increase of the number and quantity of positive
Lyapunov exponents. In Fig. 10, at the receiving end, as long as there is a mismatched parameter, every
parameter error after each round of encryption leads to error diffusion. But the proposed hyper chaotic
system does not have degeneration, and the positive Lyapunov exponents are sufficiently large, thus the
sensitivity of this parameter error is greater, and error diffusion is stronger.
7.5 Estimation of the space of secret key
According to the order of multiplication in each transformation sub-matrix Ti j of Eq. (2), one has
A=
n−1
∏
i=1
(
n
∏
j=i+1
Tαiβ j
)
(34)
by ranking the subscript of Ti j with all possible orders, where αi and β j should satisfy the following
conditions: 
αi∈{1,2, · · · ,n−1},
αp 6=αq if p 6= q,
β j∈{2,3, · · · ,n} for j = i+1, i+2, · · · ,n,
βr 6=βs if r 6= s,
β j>αi.
(35)
According to the above rules, the subscript of Tαiβ j in (34) is sorted as
S = α1β2,α1β3, · · · ,α1βn,α2β3,α2β4, · · · ,α2βn, · · · ,αn−1βn.
In each exchange of the subscript αiβ j of Tαiβ j , we get a corresponding new subscript order, each of which
can be used as a key for the speech encryption. According to the above ordering rule, the number of all
possible orders is K(1)s =
(n
2
)
. Then according to order of priority E(S,αi) in Eq. (5), the total corresponding
sort is K(2)s = n!.
(1) In the first level of encryption, position of every bit of the compressed data is permuted randomly,
set n = 6, the number of possible order is
K1s = K
(1)
s ·K(2)s =
(
6
2
)
·6! = 9.4154 ·1014.
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(2) In the second level of encryption, the obtained data is further permuted in the level of byte, set n= 7,
the number of all possible order is
K2s = K
(1)
s ·K(2)s =
(
7
2
)
·7! = 2.575 ·1023.
(3) In the third level of encryption, it is operated with a multi-round chaotic stream cipher. At 5-rounds
encryption, the number of the valid key parameters is 9. When the error for mismatch valid key parameters
{∆ai, j}3,3i=1, j=1 is less than the value in the error matrix mismatch valid key parameters in Eq. (33). The
original speech signal can be decrypted. Therefore, the size of key space is
K3s =
3
∏
i=1
(
3
∏
j=1
|ai, j|
|∆ai, j|
)
= 3.2607 ·1064.
To sum up, the size of the key space for three-level encryption system is
Ks = K1s ·K2s ·K3s = 7.9055 ·10102.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, a chaotic map-based multicast scheme for multiuser wireless communication was designed
and implemented in an ARM-embedded platform. Detailed hardware experiment results are provided to
show its real performance. Comprehensive theoretical analysis results support security performance of the
proposed secure speech wireless communication scheme.
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